Russia Invaded, Week 1. The State of Play

By / / Gov & Politics / 17 minutes of reading



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It has been a week since the Ukrainian Army rolled across the lightly defended border with Russia’s Kursk Oblast and set off a panic in the Kremlin…and in the White House. Rather than cover this in my weekly Putin’s War update, I thought I’d cover this as a standalone subject for as long as the punitive expedition lasts. For the story’s genesis, check out my update last week; see Putin’s War, Week 128. Russia Invaded.

CURRENT SITUATION

This is how the operation unfolded.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces currently occupy about 400 square miles of Kursk Oblast.

For ease of reading, I’m converting the additional tweets in the thread to a paragraph. As you can see, that depiction of the front line was developed by using a combination of geolocated images and information from Russian sources on Telegram. The frontline trace should be considered conservative.

Russian milbloggers claimed on Aug. 11 that Ukrainian offensive activity decreased in Kursk Oblast, however, a prominent milblogger refuted these claims on Aug. 12 & noted that Russian forces are far from stabilizing the situation, in part due to poor command and control (C2).

 Ukrainian forces reportedly launched new incursions into western Kursk Oblast near Slobodka-Ivanovka (NW of Sumy City & 2 km from the border), Tetkino (south of Slobodka-Ivanovka), Gordeevka, Uspenka, & Viktorovka (all north of Sumy City along the border & south of Korenevo).

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Slobodka-Ivanovka, Uspenivka, and Viktorovka.

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Snagost (south of Korenevo) and Kremyanoye (east of Snagost) and that Ukrainian forces are attacking north and south of Korenevo in an attempt to bypass the settlement.

Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Kremyanoye and east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo), and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Zhuravli towards Obshchy Kolodez (northeast of Korenevo).

Additional geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in a forest area north and east of Semenovka during a likely battalion-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Kauchuk, although the exact contours of Ukraine’s advance are unclear.

Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Sudzha and northern Zaoleshenka (west of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized Sudzha and Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha).

Additional geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian vehicles operating in northern Giri (SE of Sudzha) and Russian forces ambushing Ukrainian forces in central Giri, indicating that Ukrainian forces at least temporarily advanced into the settlement, although it is unclear if Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Borki (southeast of Sudzha), suggesting that Ukrainian forces likely advanced into Giri from the west.

Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Darino (northwest of Sudzha and three kilometers from the international border).

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted cross-border incursions with armored vehicle support from Sumy Oblast northwest of Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast near Kolotilovka and Prelesye and south of Grayvoron near Bezymeno.

INSIDE THE KREMLIN

Putin Gets Testy with Kursk’s Governor

Putin Doubles Down on No Negotiations

As I’ve posted before, Putin’s position on potential negotiations remains maximalist. He insists that Ukraine recognize Russia’s annexation of five Ukrainian oblasts and withdraw troops from their administrative boundaries as a precondition to talks that would presumably demand even more Ukrainian concessions.

BACKGROUND:

Russia Has Made Three Peace Proposals Since April and They Have Two Things in Common – RedState

The New Russian Peace Deal Shows Why Peace Between Russia and Ukraine Isn’t Possible Yet – RedState

The conditions for [ending the war] involve the complete withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. There are other conditions, but these are all subjects for fairly detailed consideration during possible joint efforts.

Since the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk Oblast, Putin has doubled down on his “no negotiations” stance.

Apparently, the enemy seeks to improve its negotiating positions in the future. But what kind of negotiations can we even talk about with people who indiscriminately conduct strikes at civilians and civilian infrastructure or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities?

It’s Not Fair

It brings to mind this Star Trek episode.

 

Complaint to the UN

OBJECTIVES

To better understand what is happening in Kursk, we really need a firm idea of the overall objective of the operation. At this juncture, I don’t see any definitive indication of the operational concept. I tend to think this has more of a political goal than a military one, which is not to say there aren’t military objectives. I think we can rule out it being a smash-and-grab raid.

As I noted in my post on the invasion (see  Ukraine’s Surprise Invasion of Russia Leaves Putin With the Stunned-Mullet Look ), the Ukrainians established a cover story for their troop buildup in Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast as a response to Chechens raiding across the border ( Putin’s War, Week 120. Zelensky Gets Security Agreement With the US and the Repo Man Comes for Russia). The plan was in the works for a while.

This supports the point I’ve been making for months: Despite the stories hinting that Urkaine would stay on the defensive in 2024, it simply did not have the political ability to do that. With the war stalemated, Ukraine’s friends needed something to assure them that Ukraine was putting the training and weaponry it had received to good use. The attack was a Zelensky initiative.

The attack is not a small-scale raid. It is a major operation.

The troops used not only came out of Ukraine’s strategic reserve, but it looks like some of their best units were pulled out of the front line in Dontesk. This could explain why Russian assault troops have had some success in the area of Tortetsk. It means that Ukraine was willing to gamble some minor losses of ground in the near term for the sake of this operation.

The operation not only had superb operational security but also kicked off with the massive use of drones and electronic warfare.

First, they brought down Russia’s screen of aircraft-type reconnaissance drones, effectively blinding commanders to what was happening. This may have been done by new interceptor FPVs linked to air-defence radar.

Secondly, under cover of the temporary observation blackout, short-range jammers were brought forward to the front line. These were programmed with data previously gleaned from electronic warfare reconnaissance.

After shutting down Russian reconnaissance, the Ukrainians launched their attack behind a screen of FPV drones.

The political objective of the attack was to show NATO and the EU that Ukraine still had a lot of fight left in it. 

The strategic objective seems to be nothing less than the destabilization of PUtin’s regime. Putin has locked himself in making winning the war in Ukraine an existential event for himself. Anything less than a win will probably result in him being deposed. This operation strikes at Putin’s legitimacy, and he’s reacting in a way that shows he knows that to be the case. This course of action indicates Ukraine will seize and hold a good chunk of Kursk. This could convince China to leave the sidelines and try to assist in a rational negotiated settlement rather than worry about the aftermath of Putin’s downfall.

Operationally, the Kursk invasion has the opportunity to unhinge the Russian invasion of Kharkiv. The Ukrainians are now astride the major logistics route for that Russian operation. I don’t agree with a lot of this post; I’m using it because of the map. But an advance in the direction of Belaya would give the Russian commander of the Kharkiv invasion force something to think about. 

Another operational outcome is that the troops to stop the Ukrainian invasion have to come from somewhere. That somewhere is the front lines in Luhansk and Donetsk. Getting those troops into action requires a 500-mile motor march or train ride. In my last update, I posted video of a Russian convoy preparing for that journey. Not only will there be substantial attrition of vehicles along the way, but they will also come under FPV and HIMARS attack long before they are in combat. On the other hand, the Ukrainians are working with interior lines of communication that give them the ability to shuttle units about the battlefield much more efficiently.

Another little-mentioned impact this invasion has is that it may have given Ukrainian hackers control of the Russian railway system.

If the railway staff at Sudzha didn’t destroy their control systems before fleeing, Russia would have a new set of problems.

SHAKE UP IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Putin has removed the Army as the responsible agent for managing the invasion of Kursk and given the responsibility to the FSB. There are two competing theories on this. First, and in my view, the most likely is that Putin no longer trusts the military’s high command. That said, his refusal or political inability to remove Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and numerous other failed commanders points to limitations on his ability to manage the conflict. Handing the command of the new “counter-terrorist” operation to the FSB also mirrors how he handled the Second Chechen War. If the latter is the case, we can probably expect a spate of “false flag” attacks in Russia to raise the outrage level.

What the military high command knew and when it knew it continues to be a puzzle. The Russian Telegram account “VchK-OGPU,” which has a solid reputation for reliability, carries this story. It leaves some heavy and unanswered questions in the air.

Meet the New Boss, Not the Same as the Old Boss

The new boss is an FSB veteran, former deputy chief of the GRU and governor of Tula province, and Secretary of the State Council of Russia Aleksey Dyumin. He’s a former Putin bodyguard who led the kinetic portion of the annexation of Crimea.

While Dyumn’s brief certainly has pushing Ukraine out of Kursk as its priority, he seems to be looking for who to blame.

A Brief History of Russian Pacification Operations Using the Secret Police

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Friendly Fire

Friendly fire is not all that unusual in a dynamic operational situation, particularly when multiple headquarters are involved, and the planning is total crap. In this case, local defenders mistook a reinforcement column for marauding Ukrainian special forces and called for helicopter gunship support. Scared troops tend to see their worst fears. 

Medical Operations

This story dovetails with what has been previously reported about the level of care given to Russian wounded by the Russian Army.

Cultural Appropriation

Convoy Destroyed

Last week, I posted on a Russian relief convoy caught in the open and hit by HIMARS. This is another video in the same vein.

Russians Digging In

As both sides have discovered over the last 30 months of combat, a prepared defense with trenches and mines can stop a very determined offense. A sure sign that the Russians don’t think the Ukrainian push into Kursk will end anytime soon is that they are digging in.

Prisoners of War

The number of Russian prisoners is reported to exceed 1,000 so far. These are mostly ill-equipped conscripts who thought they were serving out their duty in a quiet and remote area of the Russian Empire. Significantly, the FSB border troops gave up without a fight.

Some of the prisoners are from a unit linked to the Bucha massacre; see The Ukrainian Army Liberates Territory From Russian Invaders and Discovers Murdered Civilians and Shocking Evidence of Mass-Scale Russian War Crimes Raises the Stakes in Ukraine.

These are Chechens.

More captured Russian conscripts in Kursk pic.twitter.com/9kHLNWreKX

Evacuated Equipment One of the major differences that is becoming apparent between the Ukrainian and Russian Armies is that the Russians tend to walk away from damaged vehicles and sometimes vehicles that are just out of fuel. The Ukrainians recover them. Here a Ukrainian tank transporter is seen inside the Kursk penetration removing a damaged Stryker. That vehicle will be back in action in weeks.

CIVIL-MILITARY MATTERS

Alcohol Ban

It’s hard to see how it helps matters to make the locals twitchy and given to reporting dancing elephants. It may be a roundabout way of making everyone evacuate the area.

Civilian Morale

Civilian Evacuation

Note that the evacuation covers not only Kursk Oblast but neighboring Belgorod Oblast.

White House Panty Wetting

Considering that Russia has waged a full-scale war against Ukraine for two-and-a-half years and targeted civilian population centers and infrastructure such as hydroelectric dams and holding a nuclear power plant hostage, it seems strange to me that the White House would be filling up its collective Depends® at the thought of “severe retaliation” by Russia. But here we are.

OUTLOOK

Right now, the Ukrainians look to be in the catbird seat. The Russian military command is discredited and in disarray. The new chain of command will take a while to sort itself out, and Army commanders may even push back against their new FSB overlord. The operation is definitely a black eye for Putin. He has a lot of difficult choices to make:

  • How many troops does he pull out of combat in Donbas to push the Ukrainians out of Kursk?
  • What level of risk is he willing to take on the current front line being breached by a Ukrainian attack?
  • Is he willing to risk his personal regime protection force in direct combat with some very good Ukrainian units?

The challenge for Zelensky will be converting this into something tangible that moves the cause of Ukrainian independence forward. 

In combat, like most other human endeavors, there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. Ukraine has hazarded a large number of trained and experienced troops on this operation. There will be an incentive to take advantage of the sparsely or undefended territory to rack up territorial gains. Those gains will come at the expense of being able to defend against a counterattack. If things go pear-shaped, Ukraine could find itself in a great deal of trouble.





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Avatar of Christina Baird
Christina Baird is a writer with a passion for travel, fashion, automotive, and arts. In her free time, Christina enjoys taking walks in the park and listening to audiobooks.

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